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SRAD Director’s Corner

The People’s Republic of China’s Challenge to US Security
George Shatzer
Review of

The Long Game: China’s Grand Strategy to Displace American Order
By Rush Doshi

and
The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict
By Elbridge A. Colby

This “SRAD Director’s Corner” is the inaugural contribution by Colonel George
Shatzer, director of the Strategy Research and Analysis Division of the Strategic

Studies Institute at the US Army War College. In each contribution, Shatzer

will discuss books of relevance to US Joint planners and strategists, as well
as those of our allies and strategic partners. He will apply his experience and
education as a US Army senior strategist to extract insights useful to anyone

contemplating how to confront the challenges of today’s strategic environment.

I

Keywords: China, great-power conflict, People’s Liberation Army,
grand strategy, Taiwan

n 2008, I began my first joint tour of duty at then-United States Pacific
Command (USPACOM). Returning from a deployment to Iraq during
the Surge with the 25th Infantry Division, the assignment was my
introduction to planning for the military challenge the People’s Republic of
China (PRC) presented to the United States, its allies, and its partners—
especially Taiwan. For the next three years, the joint planning team I
helped lead focused on studying the emerging capabilities of the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) and what the appropriate responses ought to be
should the PRC initiate military operations against the United States, Taiwan,
and other countries.
During this time, among US military officers, the potential PLA military
threat was not a settled matter. Even some senior leaders serving in the
region questioned whether China could mount a credible threat to Taiwan or
anyone else. Many of them still viewed the PLA and its ground, air, and naval
components as a Cold War–era mass-conscription force, armed with relic Sovietand Chinese-produced knockoff equipment, that had no recent operational
experience. And, the most recent experience of the PLA was, at best, an
inconclusive four-week-long 1979 invasion of Vietnam which ended with China
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withdrawing all its units after suffering thousands of casualties at the hands
of a force composed mainly of Vietnamese militia. Further, as these skeptics
pointed out, Taiwan has an 80-mile wide moat between it and mainland China,
and Taiwan fields a small but capable, modern military force equipped by the
United States. Russia or violent extremist groups, especially radical Islamists
such as al-Qaeda, were certain to be the threats worthy of US military attention
for the foreseeable future—or so the predominant thinking went. After all, thenSecretary of Defense Robert Gates explicitly stated in 2008 the United States
had to focus on winning the ongoing war in Iraq even if it meant diverting
resources and energy from preparing for future threats.
These assessments did not take into account (or were even wholly ignorant
of ) the rapid advance of PLA warfighting capabilities made in the preceding
decade-plus since the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. When our team briefed the
new PLA capabilities in reconaissance, command and control, long-range
precision fires, air combat, air defense, anti-surface warfare, and many other areas,
we could see some senior leaders were beginning to understand the problem—
the PRC was building a suite of advanced combat means that could overwhelm
the Taiwan military and prevent the US military from effectively intervening in
a conflict near Taiwan. At the same time, the term “anti-access and area-denial”
(A2/AD) entered the common professional security parlance.
The US consensus view of the PRC threat relative to others has changed much
since 2008. Violent extremism remains a pernicious problem but one that now
seems manageable through intelligence, law enforcement, special operations forces,
and partner forces. Further, US defeats in Iraq and Afghanistan, while ragged and
senseless, have not yet created an existential threat to American security. Russia
has demonstrated it is a serious threat to European security (as well as in Syria
and elsewhere) but has limited options beyond aggression against its immediate
neighbors, especially if NATO chooses to act in a concerted way. Iran and North
Korea remain destabilizing threats, particularly with their developing nuclear
programs, but their effective reach for now is limited, and the United States has
options to check major moves either country might make against others.
Thus, with continued rapid growth in all forms of the PRC’s power, the
United States finally recognizes, correctly, the PRC is the single greatest
threat to US security. As the current US interim national security strategic
guidance states, only the PRC is “capable of combining its economic,
diplomatic, military, and technological power to mount a sustained challenge to
a stable and open international system.” And it is likely to remain so for many,
many years. This is why the same interim guidance centers on the need for the
United States to “prevail in strategic competition with China” (Biden, Interim
National Security Strategic Guidance, 2021, p. 20).

SRAD Director’s Corner

Shatzer

151

Despite this clarity of guidance and focus on the PRC, there understandably
remain those who worry an excessive focus on preparation for conflict w ith t he
PRC is dangerously misplaced. Beyond the salient point that this focus might
beget the war it seeks to prevent, there is the open question of whether the focus
is necessary. It seems apparent the PLA has reached parity with many US combat
capabilities and strives to reach parity, and even superiority, in many others. But,
if the PRC does not intend to compete directly with the United States, and
has no serious designs on displacing US influence globally or even regionally,
then the current US preoccupation with the PRC is possibly a serious mistake.
The question of whether China has a grand strategy to replace the
United States as the global hegemon is the central question of Rush Doshi’s
The Long Game: China’s Grand Strategy to Displace American Order, and the
title makes his conclusion clear. Doshi, the founding director of the Brookings
China Strategy Initiative and current director for China on the US National
Security Council (he completed the book prior to joining the council),
makes a compelling argument the PRC has patiently planned for decades to
overtake the United States as the world’s dominant power. As a China scholar
and a proficient Mandarin speaker, Doshi draws heavily from a variety of
publically available but hard-to-obtain PRC documents to build a convincing case
for the existence of a deliberate PRC grand strategy to counter the United States.
He defines a grand strategy as “a state’s theory of how it can achieve its strategic
objectives that is intentional, coordinated, and implemented across multiple means
of statecraft—military, economic, and political” (6).
Doshi charts the evolution of the PRC’s grand strategy to displace American
order beginning with its emotional roots in China’s “Century of Humiliation”
but forged critically by a “traumatic trifecta” of major events: the US reaction
to the Tiananmen Square Massacre in 1989, the US Gulf War against Iraq in
1990–91, and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 (11). He briefly mentions
the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1996 and the errant US strike on the Chinese embassy
in Belgrade in 1999 (though he says nothing about the EP-3 incident near
Hainan Island in 2001) but his main focus is at the grand-strategic level with most
discussion centered on political and economic issues. He addresses the military
aspects of the PRC’s strategy (mostly maritime issues) in two dedicated chapters
that take a supporting role to the full body of the narrative.

Doshi frames this strategy as one intended to displace the United States as
a regional and global hegemon by first b lunting t he U nited S tates’ e xercise
of control over affairs regionally, then building the PRC’s control over others
regionally, and finally e xpanding t hese t wo e fforts gl obally. In itially, Ch ina
followed a “hide and bide” approach to quietly blunt US control so as not to elicit
negative reactions or countermeasures from the United States and others. Then,
with new direction from then-President Hu Jintao, and with the 2008 global
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financial crisis apparently weakening US power, the PRC shifted its approach to
“actively accomplishing something” as it began to build its control in the region.
Now, Doshi argues, following the election of President Trump in 2016 and
the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, Xi Jinping, the current Chinese president,
considers time and momentum on China’s side and has firmly shifted the PRC
to expanding its blunting and building efforts globally. Doshi dedicates an entire
chapter to examining in impressive detail the political, economic, and military
aspects of all three phases.
The book has its limitations though. Doshi does not address PRC espionage or
influence operations inside the United States nor does he meaningfully consider
options the United States could take to deter China from continuing to pursue its
strategy. Nonetheless, he provides the real gem of the book in the final chapter—
the strategy the United States should follow to answer the PRC’s challenge.
His set of recommendations are thoughtful and compelling and fundamentally
recognize the growth of PRC power must be dealt with directly in a concerted,
grand strategic way.
In The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power
Conflict, Elbridge Colby argues a similar premise but arrives at slightly different
and more detailed prescriptions. Like Doshi, Colby has deep experience
with national strategy formulation as a former deputy assistant secretary of
defense for strategy and force development who led the development of the
2018 National Defense Strategy. Where Doshi focuses on grand strategy,
Colby centers squarely on defense and military strategy. He unabashedly
argues “because force is the foundational form of power and the ultimate
arbiter of disputes in the anarchic international arena, the regional balance of
power is at its core a question of military power” (17). He further suggests the
United States must accept China will not suddenly disappear as a threat
and will continue to seek to grow its power. As such, Colby calls for the
United States to play a balancing role in the Indo-Pacific and create an
“anti-hegemonic coalition” to prevent the PRC from becoming the dominant
power in the region. More specifically, the United States should pursue a
denial strategy only, not more aggressive strategies to replace the communist
party in China or more accommodating strategies that focus on influencing the
PRC to act more in line with US interests. Colby describes how this US-led
anti-hegemonic coalition should array a geographical defensive perimeter,
add certain nation states as members, and potentially consider providing
nuclear-strike capabilities to select members.
The aim of this approach would be to deny the PRC its best (not most
likely or most dangerous) course of action—a limited war to seize control of
Taiwan forcibly to remove it from, and break, the coalition. This distinction as
the best strategy is important since it addresses the view that conflict over
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Taiwan is not likely. Colby argues a focus on likely options—such as gray-zone
competition with the PRC—risks expending resources on inconsequential
matters, and most destructive options—such as nuclear war with the PRC—
are highly unlikely and have effective counters in place already. He makes a
persuasive case that seizing Taiwan is the best option for the PRC because
of the many important benefits it affords them toward gaining regional
hegemony. Hence, the United States and the coalition must focus on denying
China such a potential large gain in power.
Colby also notes US and coalition preparations for a limited war over
Taiwan would certainly build readiness to deal with other contingencies.
If his argumentation suffers, it is in his dismissal of the importance of
the gray zone as a “euphemism for actions that do not cross the threshold
of major significance” (105). This could be true when considering any one or just
a small set of actions. But, the PRC seeks to accrete the benefits of many such
actions over time for decisive effect while avoiding the risk of war directly with
the United States and its allies.
Additionally, Colby forgoes operational assessments of relative military
strengths and weaknesses between the PRC, the United States, and others.
He outlines a conceptual framework for building a defense strategy that
should be resilient beyond any discrete or purely military considerations. Yet,
he also aims for the framework to be detailed enough to provide a clear focus
for concerted action. He generally succeeds but never convinces readers his
strategy is resilient enough to deal with the extreme asymmetries in military
capabilities the PRC seeks to build.
Despite their minor shortcomings both books are strong works of
strategy. They succeed because they accurately assess the security problem the
United States faces, and they offer novel and realistic solutions.
Doshi and Colby are clear-eyed and frank about the potentially severe
threat the Communist Party of China-led PRC poses to the US-led liberal
order that underpins US security and freedom. The very nature of PRC
strategic aims and of its authoritarian political and economic systems are at
fundamental odds with that of the United States’ own. If the PRC were to realign
most of the global order under its standards, there is no doubt the US position in
the world would decline and US security would suffer. Also, both books rightly
recognize the PRC challenge is likely to intensify as the country’s economy
continues to grow larger than the economy of the United States, its already
much larger population becomes increasingly wealthy, and the Communist Party
of China grows increasingly nationalistic and confident. Both authors propose
complementary strategies that are excellent for many reasons.
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First, Doshi and Colby recognize the United States must achieve focus.
It should concentrate on, and orchestrate, a strategy to deal with the central
security problem posed by the PRC while managing other security issues that
warrant secondary attention. Without a consistent and coordinated long game of
its own, centered on a strategy of denial, the United States risks being distracted
by the here and now of regional problems at the expense of the global threat.
Second, both authors propose the United States adopt asymmetric strategies
that do not seek merely to match Chinese moves but instead endeavors to leverage
US advantages. This approach is necessary because, as noted, the PRC enjoys
real advantages over the United States which past serious threats such as Nazi
Germany, Imperial Japan, and the Soviet Union never came close to enjoying. And
given the trajectories of growth of these advantages, were the United States to try to
outspend the PRC on, say, military platforms and technology, it would be making
a mistake similar to the one the Soviet Union did during the Cold War.
Instead, the authors correctly advise the United States to build upon its
current advantages in a robust network of allies and partners to thwart the
growth of PRC power. As Doshi frames it, the United States would employ its
blunting and building strategy through political, economic, and military means
coordinated with allies and partners. For Colby, the anti-hegemonic military
coalition is the bulwark. Both approaches are necessary because of the added
resources these partners will bring and because regional partners especially
are needed to answer the “first-mover advantage” the PRC enjoys with its
geographical position and short lines of communication.
Finally, Doshi and Colby propose strategies which advance US
thinking about its response to China’s challenge. Both note the current
US debate over how to deal with the PRC is mired between the two poles
of accommodating or changing—trying to get along with Beijing and generally
accepting its growing power, or influencing the Chinese to change their behavior
fundamentally to suit US interests. The authors recognize both strategies
are dead ends. Instead, they propose strategies that account for PRC power,
and reduce it, while rebuilding US power. Thus, Doshi and Colby resolve
a false and unproductive dichotomy in US thinking and provide a
much-needed evolution in US strategy development.
Properly recognizing and dealing with the potential threat China and the
PLA pose is the most pressing security problem the United States faces now
and in the near future. Both The Long Game and The Strategy of Denial are
important, if not vital, contributions to the study of this problem and demand
the attention of military professionals.
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